Will Quantum Computing CRACK BITCOIN!?
Published: 2025-12-21
Status:
Available
|
Analyzed
Published: 2025-12-21
Status:
Available
|
Analyzed
Predictions from this Video
Incorrect: 0
Prediction
Topic
Status
The report suggests that immediate stress about quantum computing's threat to crypto is unnecessary, and a hasty migration to post-quantum solutions could be detrimental.
"the report urges that we don't need to stress in the immediate term and also that a rushed postquantum migration could backfire."
Correct
The A16Z report indicates that Bitcoin's cryptography is unlikely to be practically breakable by quantum computers within the next 5-10 years, with a decade or more being a more realistic timeframe for a significant threat.
"fears of Bitcoin's core cryptography being practically breakable in the next 5 years aren't backed by what's publicly known today. Even a 10-year window is framed as aggressive. The report's bottom line is that you can be excited about progress while still expecting a long runway, like a decade or more, before it becomes a real hands-on thread."
Pending
Attackers are likely recording encrypted data now with the intent to decrypt it later using future quantum computers, making this a current concern for data that needs long-term confidentiality.
"this means an attacker can record encrypted data today, stash it, and wait. If a powerful enough quantum computer exists later, they can try to decrypt what they captured years ago. And sure enough, the report stresses that this storing of data is likely happening right now. So if you have data that still matters in 10, 20 or 50 years, you can't treat this as a later problem."
Pending
Quantum computers could enable the forging of future digital signatures or the derivation of private keys from public keys, but signatures created prior to such a capability existing are not retroactively compromised.
"digital signatures don't work like that. There's no secret message sitting inside a signature that a future machine can unlock. The risk is forward-looking. If a cryptographically relevant quantum computer shows up, it could let attackers forge signatures or derive private keys from public keys from that point on. But signatures created before that moment don't suddenly become suspicious retroactively."
Pending
Zero-knowledge proofs are relatively secure against quantum threats because they do not reveal the underlying secret data, meaning older proofs remain trustworthy even in the face of future quantum computing.
"zero knowledge proofs like ZK Snarks are in a better spot than people assume. Even if a proof system relies on today's cryptography, the privacy part still holds up. The proof doesn't reveal the secret data behind it, even to a future quantum attacker. That means there's nothing useful to record now and crack later, unlike encrypted messages. So old proofs won't suddenly become leaks. Proofs created before a truly powerful quantum computer exists should remain trustworthy for what they were proving at the time."
Correct
Most blockchains are not vulnerable to Harvest Now, Decrypt Later (HNDL) attacks because their ledgers are public, and quantum computing primarily affects potential future attacker actions rather than decrypting existing secret data.
"most blockchains are not exposed to HNDL attacks. When people say quantum will decrypt Bitcoin, that sounds terrifying, but it's usually the wrong verb. On most chains, the ledger is already public. Anyone can read it today. So, Quantum doesn't unlock some secret onchain diary. It just changes what attackers might do in the future."
Correct
Privacy-focused blockchain protocols that use encryption to hide transaction details are at higher risk from quantum threats if that encrypted data is stored on-chain, as it could be harvested now and decrypted later.
"Privacy tech that really does rely on encryption to keep details hidden. If encrypted transaction data ends up stored on chain, someone can copy it now and potentially read it later. That means protocols which claim to protect your private transactions forever need to be hyper aware of developments in this space."
Correct
Upgrading Bitcoin to be quantum-safe will require significant coordination among all network participants (wallets, exchanges, miners, node runners), and users will need to manually move their assets to new addresses.
"Any real upgrade to the Bitcoin network needs wallets, exchanges, miners, and node runners to move together. And a postquantum switch wouldn't be automatic. Users would have to move their coins to new quantum safe addresses. No one can do that on your behalf."
Pending
Bitcoin transactions that reveal a public key before confirmation are vulnerable to quantum attackers who could derive the private key and broadcast a conflicting transaction.
"Many BTC spends reveal your public key, then wait in the mempool before a minor confirms them. In a world with a serious quantum machine, an attacker could try to derive the private key fast and broadcast a conflicting spend."
Correct
The migration of Bitcoin to quantum-safe formats presents a challenge for dormant coins where keys have been lost or owners are unreachable, raising questions about their fate.
"Plenty of BTC hasn't moved in years because keys were lost, owners are gone, or wallets were just forgotten. If Bitcoin is to move to a new format, then what happens to those coins? Freeze them forever? Let them be swept up by whoever has quantum power? Destroy them?"
Pending
Quantum computing poses a direct threat to Bitcoin's signatures, but not its proof-of-work mining system, which would only see minor theoretical benefits and unlikely practical speedups from quantum computers.
"quantum threats target Bitcoin signatures, not the proofof work system that secures the chain economically. Mining is based on hashing where quantum computers offer only a limited theoretical boost. In practice, the costs and overhead make meaningful mining speedups unlikely. And even if big miners got a quantum edge, it would mostly shift who wins blocks, not collapse Bitcoin's security model."
Correct
A significant challenge with implementing postquantum signatures in blockchains is their larger size, which could lead to increased transaction fees, higher bandwidth and storage requirements, slower syncing, and greater pressure on smaller nodes.
"Most postquantum signatures and keys are bigger than what chains use today. Bigger signatures could mean bigger transactions. Bigger transactions could mean higher fees, more bandwidth, more storage, slower syncing, and potentially more pressure on smaller nodes."
Correct
The novelty of postquantum signature schemes introduces risks, as the ecosystem is still understanding their failure modes, and past promising designs have been broken, highlighting the potential for disaster if a blockchain adopts an insecure choice.
"These schemes are newer, and the crypto ecosystem is still learning how they fail in the real world. Some previously promising postquantum signature designs have already been broken. If a chain rushes into the wrong choice, it has the potential to end up in disaster."
Correct
Many current postquantum signature schemes do not aggregate as efficiently as existing methods, potentially requiring larger message sizes or a redesign of how multi-signature wallets and validator voting operate.
"Many quantum resistance signature options don't combine that neatly yet. So devs may need bigger messages for the same safety or to rethink how multi-IG wallets and validator voting are designed."
Correct
While there is some time pressure, developers must proceed cautiously with the development and implementation of quantum-resistant solutions, as this is critical for the future of blockchain technology.
"Although there's some time pressure here, developers need to be careful about how they develop and implement quantum resistant solutions. Sure, easier said than done, but that's crucial for the future of blockchain tech."
Pending
The A16Z report advises taking the quantum threat seriously but not planning as if a cryptographically relevant quantum computer will break Bitcoin before 2030, emphasizing the need to avoid hasty actions that could create worse problems.
"the report's recommendations moving forward. The focus is to take the threat seriously, but don't plan like a cryptographically relevant quantum computer is guaranteed to show up and break Bitcoin before 2030. Again, the important thing is not to rush things and wind up creating even worse problems further down the line."
Pending
It is recommended to immediately deploy hybrid encryption (combining current and post-quantum methods) in areas where long-term confidentiality is crucial and cost-effective, as a safeguard against Harvest Now, Decrypt Later (HNDL) risks.
"deploying hybrid encryption immediately, at least anywhere that long-term confidentiality matters and the cost is tolerable. Hybrid here just means you use the current encryption approach and a postquantum one together, so you're protected even if one side turns out weaker than expected. This is aimed at the harvest now, decrypt later or HNDL risks we discussed earlier."
Correct
Hybrid hashed-based signatures should be deployed now in contexts like software and firmware updates where their larger size is manageable, ensuring the integrity of the update pipeline against future quantum threats.
"hybrid hashedbased signatures right now in places where their big size is acceptable, especially software and firmware updates. Now, this is not exactly about blockchains. It's about making sure the update pipeline stays trustworthy in the future."
Correct
Blockchains should begin planning for the adoption of postquantum signatures, acknowledging the significant trade-offs involved, such as increased data size, higher costs, and engineering complexity, rather than rushing the implementation.
"blockchains shouldn't rush postquantum signatures, but they should start planning now. The point is that postquantum signatures often come with real trade-offs, whether that's bigger data, higher costs, harder engineering, or simply more ways to mess up implementations."
Pending
Privacy-focused blockchains need to prioritize quantum preparedness more urgently, as their core function of keeping transaction details private is directly threatened by the ability of attackers to harvest and later decrypt stored encrypted data.
"privacy chains should treat this as more urgent than others. If a chain's promise is that your transaction details stay private, then stored encrypted data is exactly what attackers can harvest. Now, the report's recommendation is basically that. If performance allows, move now and consider hybrid designs or bigger changes that avoid putting decryptible secrets on chain in the first place."
Pending
In the short term, developers should prioritize the security of current implementations over immediate quantum mitigation, as bugs and implementation errors in complex cryptographic systems pose a more immediate and exploitable threat than quantum computing.
"we should prioritize implementation security over quantum mitigation in the near term. Here, it's essentially telling devs that bugs will wreck you faster than quantum computing will. Postquantum schemes can be harder to implement safely, and complex crypto systems are always hunting grounds for edge case failures and dumb mistakes, which nefarious actors love to exploit."
Correct
Sustained investment in quantum computing development and talent is crucial, even with a long timeline, as it is a matter of national security; an adversary gaining a quantum advantage first would have far-reaching implications beyond cryptocurrency.
"Fund quantum computing development and talent. It even points out that this is a matter of national security. If a major adversary gains cryptographically relevant capability first, the risk isn't limited to the coins in our wallets. It's everything that still depends on today's public key cryptography. So sustained investment, research centers, and training are imperative even if the timeline is long."
Correct
It's important to remain level-headed and maintain perspective when quantum computing milestones are announced, recognizing that these numerous advancements do not signify the end of the development process but rather indicate that many steps still lie ahead.
"keep level-headed and maintain perspective when quantum milestones hit the news. There will be endless announcements, whether that's more cubits, better error rates, new chips, or new benchmarks. The point is that the inevitable flood of milestones is not proof that the finish line is upon us, but rather it's proof that many steps still remain."
Correct
While not definitively impossible, the likelihood of a cryptographically relevant quantum computer emerging within the next 5 years is considered highly unlikely.
"won't argue that a cryptographically relevant quantum computer in 5 years is literally impossible, only highly unlikely."
Pending
The crypto industry is actively developing quantum-resistant solutions, and the aligned incentives among stakeholders suggest a collaborative path forward, with progress expected incrementally, indicating that there is still time to prepare.
"the good news for crypto holders is that devs are already working on solutions. Incentives are strongly aligned for all crypto stakeholders to work together towards a quantum resistant future, but progress will be made in steps, not leaps. In other words, there's still time."
Correct